Christian List

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 => Causation and causal explanation


In recent years, I have developed an interest in theories of causation and particularly 'exclusion arguments' regarding causation in multi-level systems such as social or cognitive systems.

According to such arguments, causation at a subvenient level (e.g., an individual or neural level) competes with, or even excludes, causation at a supervenient level (e.g., a social or mental one) and/or vice-versa.

I am engaged in joint work with Peter Menzies challenging various exclusion arguments (here drawn particularly from the philosophy of mind).

Jointly with Richard Bradley and Franz Dietrich, I have also worked on the aggregation of causal judgments across multiple individuals (e.g., in an expert panel), where causal judgments are represented using Bayesian networks.


The exclusion argument against free will, and what’s wrong with it (with P. Menzies)

Methodological Individualism and Holism in Political Science: A Reconciliation (with K. Spiekermann), American Political Science Review 107(4): 629-643, 2013

Mentalism versus behaviourism in economics: a philosophy-of-science perspective (with F. Dietrich), 2012

Non-Reductive Physicalism and the Limits of the Exclusion Principle (with Peter Menzies), Journal of Philosophy CVI(9): 475-502, 2009

Aggregating Causal Judgements (with Richard Bradley and Franz Dietrich), 2006

The Causal Autonomy of the Special Sciences (with Peter Menzies), in C. Mcdonald and G. Mcdonald (eds.), Emergence and Causation, Oxford (Oxford University Press) (forthcoming)

What a dualist should say about the exclusion argument (with Daniel Stoljar), 2007

Other papers on scientific explanation

Craig's Theorem and the Empirical Underdetermination Thesis Reassessed, Disputatio 7: 28-39, 1999



Last modified December 2013

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