=> Causation and causal explanation
In recent years, I have developed an interest in
theories of causation and particularly
'exclusion arguments' regarding causation in
multi-level systems such as social or cognitive
According to such arguments,
causation at a subvenient level (e.g., an
individual or neural level) competes with, or
even excludes, causation at a supervenient level
(e.g., a social or mental one) and/or
I am engaged in joint work with
Peter Menzies challenging various exclusion
arguments (here drawn particularly from the
philosophy of mind).
Richard Bradley and Franz Dietrich, I have also
worked on the aggregation of causal judgments
across multiple individuals (e.g., in an expert
panel), where causal judgments are represented
using Bayesian networks.
My brain made me do it: The exclusion argument against free will, and
what’s wrong with it (with P. Menzies)
(with R. Bradley and F.
Dietrich), Philosophy of Science 81: 491-515, 2014
Methodological Individualism and Holism in
Political Science: A Reconciliation (with K.
Spiekermann), American Political Science Review
107(4): 629-643, 2013
Mentalism versus behaviourism in economics: a
philosophy-of-science perspective (with F.
Non-Reductive Physicalism and the Limits of
the Exclusion Principle (with Peter Menzies), Journal of
Philosophy CVI(9): 475-502, 2009
The Causal Autonomy of the Special Sciences (with Peter Menzies),
in C. Mcdonald and G. Mcdonald (eds.), Emergence and Causation, Oxford
(Oxford University Press)
Does the exclusion argument put any pressure on dualism?
Other papers on scientific
Theorem and the Empirical Underdetermination Thesis Reassessed,
7: 28-39, 1999