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Christian List |
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Christian List FBA Professor of Political Science and Philosophy Departments of Government and Philosophy London School of Economics London WC2A 2AE, U.K.
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I work at the intersection of philosophy, economics, and political science, with a particular focus on individual and collective decision-making and the nature of intentional agency. Recently, a growing part of my work has addressed metaphysical questions, e.g., about free will, causation, probability, and the relationship between “micro” and “macro” levels of explanation in the human and social sciences. Although my interests may seem eclectic, the different strands of my work complement each other. One can often make progress on some issues by developing connections between different fields. Below is a thematically organized list of some of my recent papers. At the bottom, there is a list of some earlier representative papers. Click here for a full list of my papers, here for an overview by projects, and here for books or edited collections. Some recent papers On higher and lower levels in science, non-reductive physicalism, dualism, chance, and causation Does the exclusion argument put any presure on dualism? (with D. Stoljar), Australasian Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming) [preprint | official journal link] Levels: descriptive, explanatory, and ontological Dynamic and stochastic systems as a framework for metaphysics and the philosophy of science (with M. Pivato) Emergent Chance (with M. Pivato), The Philosophical Review 124(1): 119-152, 2015 Non-Reductive Physicalism and the Limits of the Exclusion Principle (with P. Menzies), Journal of Philosophy CVI(9): 475-502, 200 On the theory of individual choice What matters and how it matters: A choice-theoretic representation of moral theories (with F. Dietrich) Reason-based choice and context-dependence: An explanatory framework (with F. Dietrich), Economics and Philosophy 32(2): 175-229, 2016 Mentalism versus behaviourism in economics: a philosophy-of-science perspective (with F. Dietrich), Economics and Philosophy 32(2): 249-281, 2016 A reason-based theory of rational choice (with F. Dietrich), Nous 47(1): 104-134, 2013 Where do preferences come from? (with F. Dietrich), International Journal of Game Theory 42(3): 613-637, 2013 What's wrong with the consequence argument: In defence of compatibilist libertarianism Free Will, Determinism, and the Possibility of Doing Otherwise, Nous 48(1): 156-178, 2014 My brain made me do it: The exclusion argument against free will, and what’s wrong with it (with P. Menzies), in H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock, and H. Price (eds.), Making a Difference, Oxford (Oxford University Press) (forthcoming) Two Intuitions about Free Will: Alternative Possibilities and Intentional Endorsement (with W. Rabinowicz), Philosophical Perspectives 28: 155-172, 2014 On political philosophy Freedom as independence (with L. Valentini), Ethics 126(4): 1043-1074, 2016 The Methodology of Political Theory (with L. Valentini), Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology (forthcoming) Can there be a global demos? An agency-based approach (with M. Koenig-Archibugi), Philosophy and Public Affairs 38(1): 76-110, 2010 Deliberation, Single-Peakedness, and the Possibility of Meaningful Democracy: Evidence from Deliberative Polls (with R. C. Luskin, J. S. Fishkin and I. McLean), Journal of Politics 75(1): 80-95, 2013 The Logical Space of Democracy, Philosophy and Public Affairs 39(3): 262-297, 2011 Group Communication and the Transformation of Judgments: An Impossibility Result, Journal of Political Philosophy 19(1): 1-27, 2011 On group agency and social ontology What is it like to be a group agent? Nous (forthcoming) Three kinds of collective attitudes, Erkenntnis 79(9,Suppl.): 1601-1622, 2014 Methodological Individualism and Holism in Political Science: A Reconciliation (with K. Spiekermann), American Political Science Review 107(4): 629-643 On formal epistemology Belief revision generalized: A joint characterization of Bayes's and Jeffrey's rules (with F. Dietrich and R. Bradley), Journal of Economic Theory 162: 352-371, 2016 From Degrees of Belief to Beliefs: Lessons from Judgment-Aggregation Theory (with F. Dietrich) Reasons for (prior) belief in Bayesian epistemology (with F. Dietrich), Synthese 19(5): 787-808, 2013 On judgment aggregation and social choice Social Choice Theory, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2013 Edition Probabilistic opinion pooling [an introductory review] (with F. Dietrich), Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy (forthcoming) The theory of judgment aggregation: An introductory review, Synthese 187(1): 179-207, 2012 The aggregation of propositional attitudes: towards a general theory (with F. Dietrich), Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3, 2010 Probabilistic Opinion Pooling Generalized (with F. Dietrich), Part One: General Agendas, Part Two: The Premise-based Approach Majority voting on restricted domains (with F. Dietrich), Journal of Economic Theory 145(2): 512-543, 2010 Some earlier representative papers Group decisions in humans and animals: a survey (with L. Conradt), Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 364: 719-742, 2009 Independence and interdependence in collective decision making: an agent-based model of nest-site choice by honeybee swarms (with C. Elsholtz and T. D. Seeley), Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 364: 755-762, 2009 Strategy-proof judgment aggregation (with F. Dietrich), Economics and Philosophy 23(3): 269-300, 2007 Arrow's theorem in judgment aggregation (with F. Dietrich), Social Choice and Welfare 29(1): 19-33, 2007 A Conditional Defense of Plurality Rule: Generalizing May's Theorem in a Restricted Informational Environment (with R. E. Goodin), American Journal of Political Science 50(4): 940-949, 2006 The Discursive Dilemma and Public Reason, Ethics 116(2): 362-402, 2006 A Model of Path-Dependence in Decisions over Multiple Propositions, American Political Science Review 98(3): 495-513, 2004 Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation (with J. S. Dryzek), British Journal of Political Science 33(1): 1-28, 2003 Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result (with P. Pettit), Economics and Philosophy 18: 89-110, 2002 (companion paper in Synthese 2004) Two Concepts of Agreement (revised version), The Good Society 11(1): 72-79, 2002 Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem (with R. E. Goodin), Journal of Political Philosophy 9(3): 277-306, 2001 |
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