|
Can groups be
agents over and above their members? In a jointly authored book with Philip Pettit,
I address this question.
We suggest
that good social-scientific methodology often requires the
ascription of intentional states to groups (not merely to
individuals), but we also argue that group agency has
'individualistic' foundations. |
 |
We further ask what
the recognition of group agency implies for various normative
questions, for example about responsibility, group personhood, and
identification.
In separate work, I
have explored the
nature of collective attitudes
(collective beliefs and desires), the debate about
methodological individualism versus holism,
and the phenomenon of
group
consciousness.
Highlights
What is it like to be a group agent?
Nous 52(2): 295-319, 2018
Three kinds of collective attitudes,
Erkenntnis 79(9, Suppl.): 1601-1622, 2014
Methodological Individualism and Holism in
Political Science: A Reconciliation (with K.
Spiekermann), American Political Science Review
107(4): 629-643, 2013
Episteme Symposium on Group Agency: Replies to
Gaus, Cariani, Sylvan, and Briggs (with P.
Pettit), Episteme 9(3): 293-309, 2012
Group
Agency and Supervenience (with
Philip Pettit),
Southern Journal of Philosophy XLIV (Spindel
Supplement): 85-105, 2006; reprinted in J. Hohwy and J. Kallestrup (eds.),
Being Reduced, Oxford (Oxford University Press), 2008
Group
knowledge and group rationality: a judgment aggregation perspective,
Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 2(1): 25-38, 2005
On
the Many as One (with
Philip Pettit), Philosophy and
Public Affairs 33(4): 377-390, 2005
Other papers
Collective wisdom: a judgment aggregation perspective, in Helene Landemore and Jon Elster (eds.), Collective Wisdom: Principles and
Mechanisms, 2012
Distributed
Cognition: A Perspective from Social Choice Theory,
in M. Albert, D. Schmidtchen and S. Voigt (eds.), Scientific
Competition: Theory and Policy, Conferences on New Political Economy
vol. 24, Tuebingen (Mohr Siebeck), 2008
|
