In progress

The impossibility of non-manipulable probability aggregation (with F. Dietrich) 

The first-personal argument against physicalism  

2024

A quadrilemma for theories of consciousness, Philosophical Quarterly, online early, 2024 

Probabilistically coherent credences despite opacity, Economics and Philosophy, online early, 2024 

Levels of Description and Levels of Reality, in A. Wilson and K. Robertson (eds.), Levels of Explanation, OUP, forthcoming

Dynamically rational judgment aggregation (with F. Dietrich), Social Choice and Welfare, online early, 2023 

Mechanical Choices: A Compatibilist Libertarian Response, Criminal Law and Philosophy 18: 109-131, 2024

Agential Possibilities, Possibility Studies and Society 1(4): 399-513, 2023

Do group agents have free will?, Inquiry, online early, 2023

The many-worlds theory of consciousness, Nous 57(2): 316-340, 2023

The naturalistic case for free will, in S. Ioannidis et al. (eds.), Levels of Reality in Science and Philosophy, Springer, 2022

Special Science Counterfactuals, The Monist 105(2): 194-213, 2022

Group Responsibility, Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility, 2022

Group Agency and Artificial Intelligence, Philosophy and Technology 34: 1213-1242, 2021

Dynamic and stochastic systems as a framework for metaphysics and the philosophy of science (with M. Pivato), Synthese 198(3): 2551-2612, 2021

2020

The relation between degrees of belief and binary beliefs: A general impossibility theorem (with F. Dietrich), invited contribution to a CUP volume on Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief, edited by Igor Douven, 2020

What normative facts should political theory be about? Philosophy of science meets political liberalism (with L. Valentini), Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy 6: 185-220, 2020

Free will: real or illusion? (A debate with G. D. Caruso and C. J. Clark) The Philosopher 108(1), 2020

2019

Levels: descriptive, explanatory, and ontological, Nous 53(4): 852-883

What's wrong with the consequence argument: In defence of compatibilist libertarianism, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119(3): 253-274

2018

Democratic Deliberation and Social Choice: A Review, Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy

From Degrees of Belief to Binary Beliefs: Lessons from Judgment-Aggregation Theory (with F. Dietrich), Journal of Philosophy 115(5): 225-270

What is it like to be a group agent? Nous 52(2): 295-319

2017

What matters and how it matters: A choice-theoretic representation of moral theories (with F. Dietrich), The Philosophical Review 126(4): 421-479

Probabilistic Opinion Pooling Generalized -- Part One: General Agendas (with F. Dietrich), Social Choice and Welfare 48(4): 747-786

Probabilistic Opinion Pooling Generalized -- Part Two: The Premise-based Approach (with F. Dietrich), Social Choice and Welfare 48(4): 787-814

Does the exclusion argument put any pressure on dualism? (with D. Stoljar), Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95(1): 96-108 [preprint | official journal link]

My brain made me do it: The exclusion argument against free will, and what’s wrong with it (with P. Menzies), in H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock, and H. Price (eds.), Making a Difference, Oxford (Oxford University Press), 2017

2016

Reason-based choice and context-dependence: An explanatory framework (with F. Dietrich), Economics and Philosophy 32(2): 175-229

Mentalism versus behaviourism in economics: a philosophy-of-science perspective (with F. Dietrich), Economics and Philosophy 32(2): 249-281

Freedom as independence (with L. Valentini), Ethics 126(4): 1043-1074

Belief revision generalized: A joint characterization of Bayes's and Jeffrey's rules (with F. Dietrich and R. Bradley), Journal of Economic Theory 162: 352-371 (click here for earlier version with additional results)

The Condorcet jury theorem and voter-specific truth (with K. Spiekermann), in H. Kornblith and B. McLaughlin (eds.), Alvin Goldman and his Critics, Oxford (Blackwell), 2016

The Methodology of Political Theory (with L. Valentini), Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology, 2016

Probabilistic opinion pooling [an introductory review] (with F. Dietrich), Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy, 2016

Engineering Moral Machines (with M. Fisher, M. Slavkovik, and A. Winfield), Informatik Spektrum 39(6): 467-472

2015

Emergent Chance (with M. Pivato), The Philosophical Review 124(1): 119-152

2014

When to defer to supermajority testimony -- and when not, in J. Lackey (ed.), Essays in Collective Epistemology, Oxford (Oxford University Press)

Two Intuitions about Free Will: Alternative Possibilities and Intentional Endorsement (with W. Rabinowicz), Philosophical Perspectives 28: 155-172

Three kinds of collective attitudes, Erkenntnis 79(9,Suppl.): 1601-1622

Aggregating Causal Judgements (with R. Bradley and F. Dietrich), Philosophy of Science 81: 491-515

Free Will, Determinism, and the Possibility of Doing Otherwise, Nous 48(1): 156-178

Independence and Interdependence: Lessons from the Hive (with A. Vermeule), Rationality and Society 26: 170-207

2013

Social Choice Theory, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2013 Edition

Methodological Individualism and Holism in Political Science: A Reconciliation (with K. Spiekermann), American Political Science Review 107(4): 629-643

Swarm intelligence: When uncertainty meets conflict (with L. Conradt and T. J. Roper), American Naturalist 182(5): 592-610

Where do preferences come from? A summary (with F. Dietrich), Proceedings of the International Conference on Logic Across the University: Foundations and Applications (Beijing, China)

=> Our response in these Proceedings to replies to our paper: A response to Baltag, Girard, and White

A reason-based theory of rational choice (with F. Dietrich), Nous 47(1): 104-134, 2013

Deliberation, Single-Peakedness, and the Possibility of Meaningful Democracy: Evidence from Deliberative Polls (with R. C. Luskin, J. S. Fishkin and I. McLean), Journal of Politics 75(1): 80-95

Where do preferences come from? (with F. Dietrich), International Journal of Game Theory 42(3): 613-637

Reasons for (prior) belief in Bayesian epistemology (with F. Dietrich), Synthese 19(5): 787-808

Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case (with F. Dietrich), Social Choice and Welfare 40(4): 1067-1095

2012

Episteme Symposium on Group Agency: Replies to Gaus, Cariani, Sylvan, and Briggs (with P. Pettit), Episteme 9(3): 293-309

The theory of judgment aggregation: An introductory review, Synthese 187(1): 179-207

Collective wisdom: a judgment aggregation perspective, in Helene Landemore and Jon Elster (eds.), Collective Wisdom: Principles and Mechanisms, Cambridge (Cambridge University Press)

Judgment aggregation: a short introduction, in U. Maki (ed.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Economics, Amsterdam (Elsevier)

2011

The Logical Space of Democracy, Philosophy and Public Affairs 39(3): 262-297

A Model of Non-informational Preference Change (with Franz Dietrich), Journal of Theoretical Politics 23(2): 145-164

Group Communication and the Transformation of Judgments: An Impossibility Result, Journal of Political Philosophy 19(1): 1-27

2010

The Causal Autonomy of the Special Sciences (with Peter Menzies), in C. Mcdonald and G. Mcdonald (eds.), Emergence in Mind, Oxford (Oxford University Press)

Disaggregating Deliberation's Effects: An Experiment within a Deliberative Poll (with Cynthia Farrar, James Fishkin, Donald Green, Robert Luskin and Elizabeth Levy Paluck), British Journal of Political Science 40(2): 333-347

The aggregation of propositional attitudes: towards a general theory (with Franz Dietrich), Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3

Introduction to judgment aggregation (with Ben Polak), Journal of Economic Theory 145(2): 441-466 

Majority voting on restricted domains (with Franz Dietrich), Journal of Economic Theory 145(2): 512-543

The impossibility of unbiased judgment aggregation (with Franz Dietrich), Theory and Decision 68(3): 281-299

Can there be a global demos? An agency-based approach (with Mathias Koenig-Archibugi), Philosophy and Public Affairs 38(1): 76-110

2009

Non-Reductive Physicalism and the Limits of the Exclusion Principle (with Peter Menzies), Journal of Philosophy CVI(9): 475-502

Independence and interdependence in collective decision making: an agent-based model of nest-site choice by honeybee swarms (with Christian Elsholtz and Thomas D Seeley), Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 364: 755-762 

Group decisions in humans and animals: a survey (with Larissa Conradt), Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 364: 719-742

Judgment aggregation: a survey (with Clemens Puppe), in P. Anand, C. Puppe and P. Pattanaik (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Rational and Social Choice, Oxford (Oxford University Press)

Desire-as-belief revisited (with Richard Bradley), Analysis 69(1): 31-37

2008

Judgment aggregation under constraints (with Franz Dietrich), in T. Boylan and R. Gekker (eds.), Economics, Rational Choice and Normative Philosophy, London (Routledge)

A liberal paradox for judgment aggregation (with Franz Dietrich), Social Choice and Welfare 31: 59-78

Judgment aggregation without full rationality (with Franz Dietrich), Social Choice and Welfare 31: 15-39

Deliberation and Agreement, in Shawn W. Rosenberg (ed.), Can the People Govern? Deliberation, Participation and Democracy, Basingstoke (Palgrave Macmillan)

Which worlds are possible? A judgment aggregation problem, Journal of Philosophical Logic 37: 57-65

Distributed Cognition: A Perspective from Social Choice Theory, in M. Albert, D. Schmidtchen and S. Voigt (eds.), Scientific Competition: Theory and Policy, Conferences on New Political Economy vol. 24, Tuebingen (Mohr Siebeck)

2007

Strategy-proof judgment aggregation (with Franz Dietrich), Economics and Philosophy 23(3): 269-300

Judgment aggregation by quota rules: majority voting generalized (with Franz Dietrich), Journal of Theoretical Politics 19(4): 391-424

Arrow's theorem in judgment aggregation (with Franz Dietrich), Social Choice and Welfare 29(1): 19-33

2006

A Conditional Defense of Plurality Rule: Generalizing May's Theorem in a Restricted Informational Environment (with Robert E. Goodin), American Journal of Political Science 50(4): 940-949

Group Agency and Supervenience (with Philip Pettit), Southern Journal of Philosophy XLIV (Spindel Supplement): 85-105; reprinted in J. Hohwy and J. Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced, Oxford (Oxford University Press), 2008

Republican Freedom and the Rule of Law, Politics, Philosophy and Economics 5(2): 201-220

Special Majorities Rationalized (with Robert E. Goodin), British Journal of Political Science 36(2): 213-241

The Discursive Dilemma and Public Reason, Ethics 116(2): 362-402

2005

Group knowledge and group rationality: a judgment aggregation perspective, Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 2(1): 25-38

On the Many as One (with Philip Pettit), Philosophy and Public Affairs 33(4): 377-390 (© 2005 Blackwell Publishing, Inc.)

The Two-Envelope Paradox: An Axiomatic Approach (with Franz Dietrich), Mind 114(454): 239-248

The Probability of Inconsistencies in Complex Collective Decisions, Social Choice and Welfare 24(1): 3-32

A Simple Proof of Sen's Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions (with Christian Elsholtz), Elemente der Mathematik 60: 45-56

2004

An Epistemic Free Riding Problem? (with Philip Pettit) In Philip Catton and Graham Macdonald (eds.), Karl Popper: Critical Appraisals, London (Routledge)  

Framing as Path-Dependence (with Natalie Gold), Economics and Philosophy 20(2): 253-277

A model of jury decisions where all jurors have the same evidence (with Franz Dietrich), Synthese (section on Knowledge, Rationality and Action) 142: 175-202

Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Response to Aldred (with John Dryzek), British Journal of Political Science 34(4): 752-758

On the Significance of the Absolute Margin, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55: 521-544

A Model of Path-Dependence in Decisions over Multiple Propositions, American Political Science Review 98(3): 495-513

Deliberative Polling als Methode zum Erlernen des demokratischen Sprechens (with Anne Sliwka), Zeitschrift fuer Politik 51(1): 87-105 (English translation)

Aggregating Sets of Judgments: Two Impossibility Results Compared (with Philip Pettit), Synthese 140(1-2): 207-235

The Impossibility of a Paretian Republican: Some Comments on Pettit and Sen, Economics and Philosophy 20(1): 1-23

Democracy in animal groups: a political science perspective, Trends in Ecology and Evolution 19(4): 168-169

Multidimensional Welfare Aggregation, Public Choice 119: 119-142

2003

The Voting Power Approach: A Theory of Measurement, European Union Politics 4(4): 487-497

Are Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility Indeterminate, Erkenntnis 58: 229-260

A Possibility Theorem on Aggregation over Multiple Interconnected Propositions, Mathematical Social Sciences 45(1): 1-13 (important correction)

Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation (with John Dryzek), British Journal of Political Science 33(1): 1-28  

2002

Intradimensional Single-Peakedness and the Multidimensional Arrow Problem, Theory and Decision 52(3): 287-301

Two Concepts of Agreement, The Good Society 11(1): 72-79; reprinted in a modified and extended form as "Substantive and Meta-Agreement", in A. van Aaken, C. List and C. Luetge (2003), Deliberation and Decision, Aldershot (Ashgate)

Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result (with Philip Pettit), Economics and Philosophy 18: 89-110

2001

Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem (with Robert E. Goodin), Journal of Political Philosophy 9(3): 277-306

Some Remarks on the Probability of Cycles, Appendix to "Epistemic Democracy"

A Note on Introducing a 'Zero-Line' of Welfare as an Escape-Route from Arrow's Theorem, Pacific Economic Review 6(2) (special section in honour of Amartya Sen): 223-238

Optimality Theory and the Problem of Constraint Aggregation (with Daniel Harbour) (abstract) The Linguistics/Philosophy Interface, MIT Working Papers in Linguistics and Philosophy 1

1999

Craig's Theorem and the Empirical Underdetermination Thesis Reassessed, Disputatio 7: 28-39

1998

Indeterminacy of Translation Reassessed: Is the Problem of Translation an Empirical Matter? Philosophical Writings 9: 23-38

Book review

Review of Maurizio Passerin d'Entreves (ed.), Democracy as Public Deliberation: new perspectives, Political Studies Review 2003

Dissertation

Mission Impossible? The Problem of Democratic Aggregation in the Face of Arrow's Theorem, DPhil-thesis in Politics, University of Oxford, submitted April 2001, examined July 2001

Older working papers

Judgment aggregation with consistency alone (with F. Dietrich) (older paper)

Opinion pooling on general agendas (with Franz Dietrich), superseded by "Probabilistic Opinion Pooling Generalized: Parts One and Two"

The Epistemology of Special Majority Voting, 2003

(web-based institutional working paper) A Note on Measuring Preference Structuration, Nuffield College Working Paper in Economics 2000-W8

(web-based institutional working paper) Multidimensional Inequality Measurement: A Proposal, Nuffield College Working Paper in Economics 1999-W27