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Standard
decision theory (as familiar from economics
and the social sciences) provides, at most, a simplified
account of individual decision-making.
Jointly with Franz Dietrich
(CNRS), I have been developing a "reason-based" approach to
the theory of individual choice which (i) improves upon standard
decision theory in both its
idealized, "classical" and its psychologically
informed, "behavioural" variants; (ii) is widely
applicable; and (iii) provides an
explicit model of the reasons behind
choices.
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This work
has been supported by the Leverhulme Trust through a Leverhulme Major
Research Fellowship.
Highlighted papers
What matters and how it matters: A
choice-theoretic representation of moral
theories (with F. Dietrich), The
Philosophical Review 126(4): 421-479, 2017
Reason-based choice and context-dependence: An
explanatory framework (with F. Dietrich),
Economics and Philosophy 32(2): 175-229
Mentalism versus behaviourism in economics: a
philosophy-of-science perspective
(with F. Dietrich), Economics and Philosophy
32(2): 249-281
A
reason-based theory of rational choice
(with F. Dietrich),
Nous 47(1): 104-134, 2013
Where do preferences come from?
(with F. Dietrich), International
Journal of Game Theory 42(3): 613-637, 2013
Reasons for (prior) belief in Bayesian
epistemology (with F. Dietrich), Synthese
19(5): 787-808, 2013
A Model of Non-informational Preference Change
(with F.
Dietrich), Journal of Theoretical Politics
23(2): 145-164, 2011
Subsidiary
papers
Where do preferences come from? A summary
(with F. Dietrich), Proceedings of the
International Conference on Logic Across the
University: Foundations and Applications
(Beijing, China), 2013
Our response in
these Proceedings to replies to our paper:
A response to Baltag, Girard, and White
Other
decision-theoretic papers
Belief revision
generalized: A joint characterization of Bayes's
and Jeffrey's rules (with F. Dietrich and R.
Bradley), Journal of Economic Theory
162: 352-371, 2016 (click
here for earlier version with additional results)
Desire-as-belief revisited (with Richard Bradley), Analysis
69(1): 31-37, 2009
The
Two-Envelope Paradox: An Axiomatic Approach (with
F. Dietrich),
Mind 114(454):
239-248, 2005
Framing
as Path-Dependence (with
N. Gold),
Economics and Philosophy 20(2): 253-277, 2004
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