How can a group of individuals make consistent
collective judgments on some propositions based
on the group members' individual judgments on
them?
In joint work with Philip Pettit in
2002 and
2004, I developed a
model of judgment aggregation, combining
axiomatic social choice theory with a logical
representation of propositions. |
|
Since then, I have extended this model
further, especially in collaboration with Franz
Dietrich. We have proved several impossibility and possibility
theorems, generalizing earlier results in social
choice theory,
including
Arrow's
impossibility
theorem,
Sen's theorem on the impossibility of a 'Paretian liberal', a variant of the
Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem on strategic
manipulation, a variant of
a
median voter theorem, and Sen's possibility
theorem on
majority voting on restricted domains.
More recently, we have studied problems of
general
attitude aggregation as well as
probabilistic opinion pooling. I've also
applied ideas from judgment-aggregation theory
to the problem of
the transformation of
judgments in group deliberation.
Highlights
Probabilistic Opinion Pooling Generalized
-- Part One: General Agendas (with F.
Dietrich), Social Choice and Welfare 48(4):
747-786, 2017
Probabilistic
Opinion Pooling Generalized -- Part Two: The Premise-based Approach
(with F. Dietrich), Social
Choice and Welfare 48(4): 787-814, 2017
Probabilistic opinion pooling [an
introductory review] (with F. Dietrich), Oxford
Handbook of Probability and Philosophy, 2016
Aggregating
Causal Judgements
(with R. Bradley and F.
Dietrich), Philosophy of Science 81: 491-515, 2014
Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case
(with F. Dietrich), Social Choice and
Welfare 40(4): 1067-1095, 2013
The theory of judgment aggregation: An
introductory review, Synthese 187(1):
179-207, 2012
The Logical Space of Democracy, Philosophy
and Public Affairs 39(3): 262-297, 2011
Group
Communication and the Transformation of
Judgments: An Impossibility Result,
Journal of Political Philosophy 19(1): 1-27, 2011
The aggregation of propositional attitudes: towards a general theory
(with Franz Dietrich), Oxford Studies in
Epistemology 3, 2010
Majority voting on restricted domains
(with Franz Dietrich), Journal of Economic Theory 145(2): 512-543, 2010
A
liberal paradox for judgment aggregation (with
Franz Dietrich),
Social Choice and Welfare 31: 59-78, 2008
Arrow's
theorem in judgment aggregation
(with
Franz Dietrich),
Social Choice and Welfare 29(1): 19-33, 2007
Strategy-proof
judgment aggregation (with
Franz Dietrich),
Economics and Philosophy 23(3): 269-300, 2007
Aggregating
Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result (with Philip Pettit),
Economics and Philosophy 18: 89-110, 2002 (see
also
companion paper in Synthese 2004)
Introductory
papers
[non-technical]
Judgment aggregation: a short introduction,
in U. Maki (ed.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Economics,
Amsterdam (Elsevier)
[non-technical] The
Discursive Dilemma and Public Reason,
Ethics 116(2): 362-402, 2006
[non-technical] Group
knowledge and group rationality: a judgment aggregation perspective,
Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 2(1): 25-38, 2005
[slightly more technical]
Judgment aggregation: a survey (with
Clemens Puppe),
in P. Anand, C. Puppe and P. Pattanaik (eds.), Oxford Handbook of
Rational and Social Choice, Oxford (Oxford University Press), 2009
[more technical]
Introduction to judgment aggregation
(with Ben Polak), Journal of Economic Theory
145(2): 441-466, 2010
Other
papers
Probabilistic
Opinion Pooling Generalized -- Part One: General
Agendas (with
F. Dietrich)
Probabilistic
Opinion Pooling Generalized -- Part Two: The
Premise-based Approach (with
F. Dietrich)
(these two papers draw on the earlier working paper
Opinion pooling on general agendas, with
F. Dietrich, 2007/2008)
When
to defer to supermajority testimony -- and when not, in J. Lackey
(ed.), Essays in Collective Epistemology, Oxford
(Oxford University Press) (forthcoming)
Judgment
aggregation with consistency alone
(with
Franz Dietrich), 2007
The
impossibility of unbiased judgment aggregation (with
Franz Dietrich), Theory and Decision 68(3): 281-299, 2010
Collective wisdom: a judgment aggregation perspective, in Hélène
Landemore and Jon Elster (eds.), Collective Wisdom: Principles and
Mechanisms (forthcoming)
Judgment aggregation under constraints
(with
Franz Dietrich),
in T. Boylan and R. Gekker (eds.), Economics, Rational Choice and
Normative Philosophy, London (Routledge), 2008
Judgment
aggregation without full rationality
(with
Franz Dietrich),
Social Choice and Welfare 31: 15-39, 2008
Which
worlds are possible? A judgment aggregation problem,
Journal of Philosophical Logic 37: 57-65, 2008
Judgment
aggregation by quota rules: majority voting generalized (with
Franz Dietrich),
Journal of Theoretical Politics 19(4):
391-424, 2007
The
Probability of Inconsistencies in Complex Collective Decisions,
Social Choice and Welfare 24(1):
3-32, 2005
A
Model of Path-Dependence in Decisions over Multiple Propositions,
American Political Science Review
98(3):
495-513, 2004
Aggregating
Sets of Judgments: Two Impossibility Results Compared
(with
Philip Pettit),
Synthese
140(1-2): 207-235
A
Possibility Theorem on Aggregation over Multiple Interconnected Propositions,
Mathematical Social Sciences 45(1):
1-13 (important
correction)