Publications
Signaling and Electing Motivations in a Voting
Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates, Econometrica
(2003), Vol. 71, No. 4, p1083-1120.
It Takes Two:
An Explanation of the Democratic Peace,, (Joint work with Gilat Levy) Journal
of the European Economic Association (2004), Vol. 2, Issue 1, pp 1-29.
A
Decision-Theoretic Basis for Choice Shifts in Groups, (Joint with Kfir Eliaz and
Group
Decision-Making in the Shadow of Disagreement, (Joint with Kfir Eliaz and
On The Limits of Communication in Multidimensional
Cheap Talk: A Comment, (Joint
with Gilat Levy, LSE). Econometrica (2007), 75
(3). pp. 885-893.
Bargaining Over
New Ideas: The Distribution of Rents and the Stability of Innovative Firms, (Joint with
Coalition Formation Under
Power Relations (joint
with Michele Piccione, LSE), Theoretical Economics (2009), 4, (1).
Bidding For
Attention and Competing for Votes in Political Debates, (Joint with Gilat
Levy, LSE), The proceedings of the Workshop on the Political Economy of
Democracy. Barcelona 2008.
When do Simple Policies
Win? (Joint with Gilat Levy, LSE), forthcoming, Economic
Theory: Special symposium in Political Economy.
Religious Beliefs, Participation and Cooperation. (Joint with Gilat Levy, LSE), forthcoming,
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics.
Working Papers
Calvin’s Reformation in Geneva: Self and Social Signalling, (November 2011, Joint with Gilat Levy, LSE), mimeo, London School of Economics.
Gradualism in Dynamic Agenda Formation, (March 2010, Joint with Gilat Levy, LSE), mimeo, London School of Economics.
Innovation and Corporate Conservatism, (April 2009, joint with Mariagiovanna Baccara), mimeo, London School of Economics.
Work
in Progress
Economics of Religion
Religious
Entrepreneurs, (Joint with Gilat Levy, LSE)
In this paper we
extend our previous paper to analyze the supply side
of religious organizations. We analyze the emergence
of religious organizations stemming from a monopolist entrepreneur and from competition
between entrepreneurs. We also investigate the effect of competition on
violence and conflict between religious groups.
A Dynastic
Model of Religious Beliefs and Participation, (Joint with Gilat Levy, LSE)
In this paper we
analyse a dynastic model in which religious/secular beliefs are transmitted
from parents to offsprings. The paper focuses on the
evolution of religious beliefs and religious participation. In particular we
investigate the long run sustainability of religions as well as the short run
effects of correlated shocks to individual utility on the individuals religious
beliefs and cultural transmission decisions.
Group Decision
Making: Talktions
In this research project
we model group decision making, deliberation and debates as mechanisms
involving (all-pay) auctions. In the presence of time/attention constraints,
group decision problems involve a scarcity in talking slots. Auctions are one
way to allocate these slots between those who wish to speak. The motivation for
this research agenda is both positive (explaining existing group decision
institutions) and normative (designing mechanisms for group decision making) .
Attention for
In this first
paper, we model a debate between two players who are trying to influence the
choice of a time/attention-constrained decision maker. In the model, the
decision maker can only choose alternatives that are on the agenda and the
agenda is endogenous. The debaters compete to put their alternatives on the
agenda by participating in an all-pay-auction for a finite number of attention
slots of the decision maker. We compare simultaneous debates, in which all
investments are taken before the debate, to sequential debates, in which
investments can be taken along with the evolution of the agenda. In a simple
model with complete information we highlight why sequential debates are
preferable to the decision maker. We show the robustness of this result for a
wide range of generalizations of the model including asymmetric information
between the debaters.
Attention for
In this paper we extend the above model to analyze strategic information
transmission with a
time/attention-constrained decision maker.
The Economics of Innovation
Innovation and Corporate Conservatism, (joint with Mariagiovanna Baccara)
Abstract: In this
paper, we study the incentives of firms to promote innovation. We analyze a situation in which an employee in a firm is
inspired with an idea for a new product. In a framework in which intellectual
property rights on ideas are imperfect, we analyze
the employee's decision of whether to disclose the idea within the firm, to
stay silent and maintain the status-quo, or to form a spin-out firm. Next, we
look at the owners of the original firm and analyze their
incentives to promote creativity among employees. We show that firms may have
incentives to discourage both internal disclosure (fearing the reshuffling of
rents within the firm caused by an intra-firm renegotiation) and spin- out
formation (fearing the increase in market competition that a new firm
generates). However, we show that innovation bonuses, when possible, mitigate
these problems and guarantee that innovation always takes place. Finally, we analyze how the governance structure affects the firm's
incentives to promote innovation.
Books
Workbook to accompany Political
Economics-Explaining Economic Policy, by Persson
and G. Tabellini (2000), with I. Brocas,
M. Castenheira and D. Stromberg, MIT Press, Cambridge
MA, London England.