Signaling and Electing Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates, Econometrica (2003), Vol. 71, No. 4, p1083-1120.


It Takes Two: An Explanation of the Democratic Peace,, (with Gilat Levy) Journal of the European Economic Association (2004), Vol. 2, Issue 1, pp 1-29.


A Decision-Theoretic Basis for Choice Shifts in Groups, (with Kfir Eliaz and Debraj Ray) American Economic Review (2006). Vol. 96, No. 4, September 2006. pp. 1321-1332.


Group Decision-Making in the Shadow of Disagreement, with Kfir Eliaz and Debraj Ray) Journal of Economic Theory (2007), Volume 132, Issue 1, January 2007, Pages 236-273.


On The Limits of Communication in Multidimensional Cheap Talk: A Comment, (with Gilat Levy). Econometrica (2007), 75 (3). pp. 885-893.


Bargaining Over New Ideas: The Distribution of Rents and the Stability of Innovative Firms, (with Mariagiovanna Baccara), Journal of the European Economic Association (2007), Vol. 5, No. 6, Pages 1095-1129.


Coalition Formation Under Power Relations (with Michele Piccione), Theoretical Economics (2009), 4, (1).


Bidding For Attention and Competing for Votes in Political Debates, (with Gilat Levy), The proceedings of the Workshop on the Political Economy of Democracy. Barcelona 2008.

When do Simple Policies Win? (with Gilat Levy), Economic Theory (Political Economy Special Issue), (2012) , 49(3).


Religious Beliefs, Participation and Cooperation. (with Gilat Levy), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, (2012) 4(3): 121-51.



Calvin’s Reformation in Geneva: Self and Social Signalling, (with Gilat Levy), Journal of Public Economic Theory, 16 (5). pp. 730-742.



Rituals or Good Works: Social Signalling in Religious Organizations, (with Gilat Levy). Journal of European Economic Association, 12 (5). pp. 1317-1360.



Dynamic Legislative Decision Making when Interest Groups Control the Agenda (with Gilat Levy), Journal of Economic Theory, 148 (5). pp. 1862-1890. This paper supersedes a previous version, "Gradualism in Dynamic Influence Games".



Preferences over Equality in the presence of Costly Income Sorting, (with Gilat Levy) American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 7, no. 2, May 2015.



Correlation Neglect, Voting Behaviour and Information Aggregation (with Gilat Levy), American Economic Review, vol. 105, no. 4, April 2015.


Does polarization of opinions lead to polarization of platforms? the case of correlation neglect, (with Gilat Levy), Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 10(3):321-355 · September 2015.



The Coevolution of Segregation, Polarised Beliefs and Discrimination: The Case of Private vs. State Education, (with Gilat Levy), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, forthcoming.


Working papers

Combining forecasts: a foundation for correlation neglect, with Gilat Levy.


Persuasion with Correlation Neglect, with Ines Moreno de Barreda and Gilat Levy.


Immigration into Prejudiced Societies: The effects of Segregation and Echo Chambers, with Gilat Levy.


Common Value Auctions with Ambiguity over Correlation, with Gilat Levy and Krittanai Laohakunakorn.


An Explanation-Based Approach to Combining Forecasts, with Gilat Levy.



Workbook to accompany Political Economics-Explaining Economic Policy, by Persson and G. Tabellini (2000), with I. Brocas, M. Castenheira and D. Stromberg, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, London England.