Optimal Monitoring Design,” (with George Georgiadis).
Econometrica, accepted.

Information Design in the Hold-up Problem,” (with Daniele Condorelli).
Journal of Political Economy, 2020(128), 681-709.

A Biological Foundation of Risk Preferences,” (with Roberto Robatto).
Journal of Economic Theory, 2017(172), 410-422.

Buyer-optimal Learning and Monopoly Pricing,” (with Anne-Katrin Roesler).
American Economic Review, 2017(107), 2072-2080.

Dynamic Contracting: An Irrelevance Result,” (with Peter Eso).
Theoretical Economics, 2017(12), 109-139.

An Alternative to Signaling: Directed Search and Substitution,” (with Matt Levy).
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2016(8), 1-15.

Contractible Contracts in Common Agency Problems,”
Review of Economic Studies, 2015(82), 391-422.

A Biological Theory of Social Discounting,” (with Arthur Robson).
American Economic Review, 2014(104), 3481-3497.

Spontaneous Discrimination,” (with Marcin Peski).
American Economic Review, 2013(6), 2412-2436.

An Evolutionary Theory of Suicide,” (with Caroline Thomas).
Games, 2013(4), 426-436.

On the Market for Venture Capital,” (with Boyan Jovanovic).
Journal of Political Economy, 2013(121), 493-527.

The Evolutionary Basis of Time Preference: Intergenerational Transfers and Sex,” (with Arthur Robson and Emil Iantchev).
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2012(4), 172-201.

Definable and Contractible Contracts,” (with Michael Peters).
Econometrica, 2012(80), 363-411.

A Resurrection of the Condorcet Jury Theorem,” (with Yukio Koriyama).
Theoretical Economics, 2009(4), 227-252.

Optimal Voting Scheme with Costly Information Acquisition,” June 2009, (with Alex Gershkov).
Click here for an NAJ Economics review.
Journal of Economic Theory, 2009(144), 36-68.

Evolution of Time Preference by Natural Selection: Comment ,” (with Arthur Robson).
American Economic Review, 2008(98), 1178-1188.

The Price of Advice,” (with Peter Eso).
RAND Jornal of Economics, 2007(38), 863-880.

Equilibrium Default Cycles,” (with Natalia Kovrijnykh).
Journal of Political Economy, 2007(115), 403-446.

Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions,” (with Peter Eso).
Review of Economic Studies, 2007(74), 705-731.

Two-Object Two-Bidder Simultaneous Auctions,”
International Game Theory Review, 2007(9), 483-493.

Can a Turing Player Identify Itself?,” (with David Levine).
Economics Bulletin, 2006, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 1-6.

Equilibrium Transformation and the Revenue Equivalence Theorem,”
Journal of Economic Theory, 2005(120), 175-205.

Compensation for Quality Difference in a Search Model of Money,” (with Yuk-fai Fong).
International Economic Review, 2005(46), 957-971.

Beyond Chopsticks: Symmetric Equilibria in Majority Auction Games,” (with Robert Rosenthal).
Games and Economic Behavior, 2003(45), 278-295.

Three-Object Two-Bidder Simultaneous Auctions: Chopsticks and Tetrahedra,” (with Robert Rosenthal).
Games and Economic Behavior, 2003(44), 114-133.