• Optimal Inflation and the Phillips Curve
  Joint with Michael McLeay. NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2020, 34 (1). Pages 199-255. Martin Eichenbaum, Erik Hurst and Jonathan Parker, eds. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Online Appendix.

• The Fall in Global Fertility: A Quantitative Model

  Joint with Tiloka De-Silva.  American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 12 (3), July 2020,  Pages 77-109.

   

• Monetary Policy for Commodity Booms and Busts
  Joint with Thomas Drechsel and Michael McLeay. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City's Jackson Hole Economic Policy Symposium 2019.

   

• The Transmission of Monetary Policy Operations through Redistributions and Durable Purchases
  Joint with Vincent Sterk. Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 99, November 2018. Pages 124-137.

   

• Commodity Booms and Busts in Emerging Economies
  Joint with Thomas Drechsel. Journal of International Economics, Vol. 112, May 2018. Pages 200-218.

• Population-Control Policies and Fertility Convergence
  Joint with Tiloka De-Silva. Journal of Economic Perspectives, Fall 2017. Vol 31, Number 31. Pages 205-228.

• Pushing on a String: US Monetary Policy is Less Powerful in Recessions
  Joint with Gregory Thwaites. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, October 2016. Volume 8, Number 4. Pages 43-74.
  Data Set used in "Pushing on a String": Extended Series of Romer and Romer's shocks 1969-2007 by Thwaites and Tenreyro.

• Trading Partners and Trading Flows: Implementing the Helpman-Melitz-Rubinstein Model Empirically
  Joint with J.M.C. Santos Silva. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, February 2015,

• Testing competing models for non-negative data with many zeros
  Joint with J.M.C. Santos Silva and Frank Windmeijer. Journal of Econometric Methods, January 2015, Volume 4. Pages 1-18.

• Hot and Cold Seasons in the Housing Market
  Joint with Rachel Ngai. The American Economic Review, December 2014, Volume 104, Issue 12. Pages 2991-1026.

• Estimating the Extensive Margin of Trade  
  Joint with J.M.C. Santos Silva and Kehai Wei. Journal of International Economics, 2014, Volume 93, Issue 1. Pages 67-75.

• Technological Diversification
  Joint with Miklos Koren. The American Economic Review, February 2013, Volume 103, Issue 1. Pages 378-414.
   Supplemental Appendix

• Further Simulation Evidence on the Performance of the Poisson-PML Estimator
  Joint with J.M.C. Santos-Silva. Economics Letters, August 2011, Volume 112, Issue 2. Pages 220–222.
   

• Wage-Setting Patterns and Monetary Policy: International Evidence
  Joint with Giovanni Olivei. Journal of Monetary Economics, October  2010, Volume 57, Issue 7. Pages 785-802
  *Data discussion: microeconomic evidence of wage rigidity in the United States, Europe, and Japan.

• Currency Unions in Prospect and Retrospect
  Joint with J.M.C. Santos Silva. Annual Review of Economics,  September 2010, Volume 2, Pages 51-74.
  Supplemental Appendix to "Currency Unions in Prospect and Retrospect"

• On the Existence of the Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Poisson Regression
  Joint with J.M.C. Santos Silva. Economics Letters, May 2010, Volume 107, Issue 2.  Pages 310-312.

• The Timing of Monetary Policy Shocks
  Joint with Giovanni Olivei. The American Economic Review, June 2007, Volume 97, No. 3: 636-663.
  *Data contribution: The paper reports results from new survey-based evidence of wage rigidity in the U.S. economy,  part of which was collected in the context of the Beige Book.
   

• Volatility and Development
  Joint with Miklos Koren. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 2007, Volume 122, No. 1: 243-287.
   

• On the Trade Impact of Nominal Exchange Rate Volatility

  Journal of Development Economics, March 2007, Volume 82, No. 2: 485-508

• The Log of Gravity
  Joint with J.M.C. Santos Silva. The Review of Economics and Statistics, November 2006, Volume 88, No. 4: 641-658.

  Previously circulated as Gravity-Defying Trade; FRB Boston Series, paper no. 03-1 (2003).
  For other questions, data, and codes, please, check the paper's page here

   

• Closed and Open Economy Models of Marked Up and Sticky Prices
  Joint with Robert Barro. The Economic Journal, April 2006, Vol. 116, No. 511: 434-456.

•  Economic Effects of Currency Unions
  Joint with Robert Barro. Economic Inquiry, January 2007, Vol. 45, No. 1: 1-197.
   

• Is Poland the Next Spain?  
  Joint with Francesco Caselli. NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics; R. Clarida, J. Frankel, and F. Giavazzi, editors, 2004.

   

•  Optimal Currency Areas
  Joint with Alberto Alesina and Robert Barro. NBER Macroeconomics Annual, Mark Gertler and Kenneth Rogoff, eds. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002.

 Working Papers 

• Dollar Dominance and the Export Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission
  Joint with Michael McLeay.
  
   Abstract: An emerging academic and policy view contends that a monetary-policy induced depreciation by a (non-US) country invoicing in dollars cannot stabilise activity, as the classical expenditure-switching channel is muted. This weakens the exchange-rate channel of monetary policy transmission. The key premises underlying this view are that i) exporters have monopoly power and ii) their prices are sticky in US dollars. However, goods priced in dollars are typically traded in highly competitive global markets and tend to have more flexible prices; this is particularly the case for exporters in emerging or developing countries. We propose a new open economy model with more realistic assumptions and show that loosening monetary policy boosts exports and activity; the limit to any expansion is not demand, but supply capacity. We furthermore show that low pass-through is not informative about the degree of nominal stickiness: limited price responses are an equilibrium result in our model, rather than an assumption. We present new evidence that both exports and activity respond strongly to exchange-rate changes driven by monetary policy.
  
  
  

• Helicopter Money: What is it and what does it do?
  Joint with Ricardo Reis. forthcoming Annual Review of Economics 2022.
  
   Abstract: We review the different meanings of helicopter money both in the literature and in the public debate around it, and clarify the conditions under which helicopter money can have an impact on real activity. To do so, we set out a simple model that encapsulates a number of potential channels of policy transmission. The model provides a taxonomy of possibilities for helicopter money to affect the economy, as well as a benchmark set of conditions under which it is neutral. We use the model to analyse and discuss the impact that helicopter drops might have in response to a number of economic shocks, including a financial crisis, a fiscal crisis, and a pandemic.
  
  
  

• The Rise in Agribusinesses and its Distributional Consequences
  Joint with Swati Dhingra 
  
   Abstract: Crops are often modelled as homogenous products that are exchanged in perfectly competitive markets. While this may be true of world commodity markets, smallholder farmers face high trade barriers in selling their crops at home and abroad. Smallholder farmers can overcome these barriers by selling to agribusinesses with better intermediation technologies. This has provided a rationale for policies encouraging agribusinesses. However, the rise of agribusinesses also skews the distribution of buyers of farm produce towards larger firms with greater buyer power. This paper documents the reliance of farmers on intermediaries and shows that farmers selling to agribusinesses differ systematically from others. We incorporate these stylised facts into a flexible theoretical framework to study the aggregate and distributional consequences of the rise of agribusinesses. Taking the theory to data, we quantify behind-the-border barriers to trade embedded in a national policy to encourage agribusiness participation. We combine this with microdata on household-crop incomes and find that the policy led to a reduction in incomes of small farmers. Losses were concentrated among farmers who sold to agribusinesses and in villages with a comparative advantage in policy-affected crops. On average, their incomes fell by 6 per cent with no offsetting gains in non-farm channels of income. Profit margins of agribusinesses specialised in policy-affected crops rose, in line with the theoretical channel. The findings contribute to the academic and policy debate on the impact of integration and market power on the size and distribution of the welfare gains from trade.
  
  

• Unequal Migration
  Joint with Rebecca Freeman, John Lewis, JMC Santos Silva and Stefan Szymanski
  
   Abstract: We study the role of skills and their interaction with barriers to migration in the decision to move. These interactions are key to determine the skill composition of the pool of immigrants in different countries. To do so, we use a novel database that documents international and intra-national moves for subjects with different skill levels. The database is unique in the migration literature in its degree of granularity, which allows us to assess the role of skills\ in amplifying or mitigating existing barriers. Consistent with previous studies, we find that the various barriers to migration, including measures of distance, tend to hamper mobility. But we identify and quantify a novel interaction between those barriers and the level of skills, such that the impact of barriers on migration decreases as the level of skill increases. At highter skill levels, %the upper end of skills, barriers appear to pose little obstacle to the migration of superstars.
  
  

• The Balance of Power: monopsony, unions, and wages in the United Kingdom
  Joint with Will Abel and Greg Thwaites 
  
   Abstract: We document the evolution of labour market concentration in the UK private sector labour market from 1998-2018, how labour unions have counterbalanced this power, and the net effect on wages. Using linked employee- rm micro-data, we find that: (1) Measures of labour market concentration have not exhibited a time trend over the time period examined. (2) There is substantial cross-sectional variation in concentration at the industry level. (3) Higher levels of labour market concentration are associated with lower pay amongst workers not covered by a collective bargaining agreement. (4) For workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement, the association between labour market concentration and pay disappears. (5) The effects of concentration and union coverage are generally larger for lower-paid workers, and workers in tradable industries. (6) Collective bargaining agreements weaken the impact of workers' outside options in other labour markets, which nonetheless remain strong.