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(Assistant Professor) in Economics
Public Economics, Contract Theory, Behavioral
Demand for Insurance and Adverse Selection - REVISED - (Web Appendix)
Abstract: Recent empirical work finds that surprisingly little variation in the demand for insurance is explained by heterogeneity in risks. I distinguish between risk preferences and demand frictions underlying the residual variation. Demand frictions induce a systematic difference between the true and revealed value of insurance. Using a sufficient statistics approach that accounts for this alternative source of heterogeneity, I find that the welfare conclusions regarding adversely selected markets are substantially different. The source of heterogeneity is also essential for the evaluation of policy interventions intended to reduce adverse selection like insurance subsidies and mandates, risk-adjusted pricing and information policies.
- Rewarding Schooling Success and Perceived Returns to Education: Evidence from India - REVISED - (with Sandra Sequeira and Guo Xu)
Abstract: This paper tests two specific mechanisms through which individuals may form expectations about returns to investments in education: receiving recognition for one's schooling performance, and exposure to successful students through family or social networks. Using a regression discontinuity design, we study the impact of a fellowship program recognizing the schooling performance of young girls in secondary school in India. We find that the fellowship award is associated with a significant increase in the perceived value of education, by both increasing the perceived mean of earnings and decreasing the perceived variance in earnings associated with additional years of schooling. Being exposed to successful students does not affect perceived returns to education for those in their family or social networks. This exposure is however associated with holding more information on potential sources of funding for schooling and a higher intention to apply for the fellowship.
- Revising Claims and Resisting Ultimatums in
Bargaining Games - R&R at Review of Economic Design - (with Frans Spinnewyn)
Abstract: We propose a mechanism which implements a unique solution to the bargaining problem with two players in subgame-perfect equilibrium. Players start by making claims and accept a compromise only if they cannot gain by pursuing their claim in an ultimatum. The player offering the lowest resistance to his opponent's claim can propose a compromise. The unique solution depends on the extent to which claims can be revised. If no revisions are allowed, compatible claims implement the Nash solution. If all revisions are allowed, maximal claims implement the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.
- The Perceptions of Employment Prospects during the Unemployment Spell (with Andreas Mueller)
- The Identification of Risk Preferences and Perceptions using Choice Data (with Philipp Kircher)
Economics (PhD, LSE course, ec534)
Economics (MSc, LSE course, ec426)
Economics (BSc, LSE course, ec301)
Microeconomics (Summer, LSE course, ec101)
cash or a secure job - which is better?" featured in Financial
Times (February 7, 2009) (link)
Role of Commitment" comment on "On the interaction between
subsidiarity and interpersonal solidarity" by Jacques Dreze (link)
- "En als we langdurig werklozen meer zouden betalen?" Op-ed in De Morgen (February 12, 2012) (link)
- "De ivoren toren van economen is een mythe" Op-ed in De Standaard (August 3, 2013) (link)
- "De mythe van de hangmat" Op-ed in De Standaard (May 15, 2014) (link)
© 2014 London School of Economics. All rights reserved. Picture by Jef Boes.